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1BUDGET SPILLOVERS IN A METROPOLITAN AREA:
TYPOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE a
Albert Solé-Ollé b
ABSTRACT: We present a model for measuring spillovers resulting from local expenditure
policies. We identify and test for three different types of budget spillovers: (i) benefit
spillovers from the production of local public goods, (ii) externalities in crowding, caused by
non-resident users of public facilities, and (iii) externalities from expenditure competition
effects. In order to account for these types of spillovers, we specify a demand of public goods
with interactions among local governments. The model is tested for different expenditure
categories with a cross-section of data from municipalities of the metropolitan area of
Barcelona. We find positive benefit spillovers in spending in Cultural and Sports facilities,
and in Parks and Streets maintenance. Externalities in crowding appear in spending on Police,
Cultural and Sports facilities, Parks and Streets maintenance, and Street cleaning, Water
delivery and Sanitation. Spending on Social services seems to be affected by competition
externalities, while there is no evidence of spillovers in the expenditure on General
Administration.
RESUMEN: Presentamos un modelo para medir los desbordamientos en las políticas locales
de gasto. Identificamos y contrastamos tres tipos de efectos desbordamiento en el gasto: (i)
desbordamiento en los beneficios derivados de la producción de bienes públicos locales, (ii)
costes de congestión creados por los residentes en jurisdicciones vecinas, y (iii) externalidades
en el gasto derivadas de la competencia fiscal. Con objeto de considerar los distintos tipos de
desbordamientos, se especifica una función de demanda de bienes públicos con interacciones
entre gobiernos locales. Las predicciones del modelo son constrastadas para seis categorías de
gasto diferentes con datos de los municipios pertenecientes al área metropolitana de
Barcelona. Los resultados identifican externalidades positivas en los gastos de Cultura y
Deporte y en Urbanismo. Los costes de congestión surgen en el gasto de Policía, Cultura y
Deporte, Urbanismo, y Bienestar Comunitario. El gasto en Servicios Sociales parece estar
influido por la competencia fiscal, mientras que no se obtiene evidencia de efectos
desbordamiento en el caso del gasto en Administración General.
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21. INTRODUCTION
Benefit spillovers are a widespread feature of many services provided by local governments.
For example, roads, public transportation, and recreation and cultural facilities are visited, and
therefore crowded, by residents in nearby jurisdictions. Crime fighting in one jurisdiction
could either lower regional crime, or push criminals into neighbouring communities. Air
pollution controls and sewage treatment enhance the environmental quality of bordering
jurisdictions. Radio and TV broadcasts can be seen away from the local border. Educational
and job training expenditures may translate in productivity gains in workplaces outside the
community.
Spillovers, or interjurisdictional externalities, have played an important role in the urban
economic literature on local government. The significance of spillovers is widely recognized
in the fiscal federalism literature, but most of the papers in this tradition simply assume the
existence of spillovers and analyse their consequences. See, for example, Brainard and
Dolbear [12], Pauly [46], Arnott and Grieson [6] and Gordon [29], for the efficiency
consequences of spillovers, and Oates [44], Boskin [11] and Conley and Dix [20] for the
implications for the design of optimal federal structures. The general conclusion of this strand
of literature is that externalities tent to cause a divergence between private and social costs
and benefits, and thus lead to suboptimal decision-making1. Some authors have also worried
about the equity consequences of spillovers,  mainly in the context of the demise of US
metropolitan areas (see, e.g., Ladd and Yinger [40]), but also relating to the design of ‘needs-
based’ equalisation grants (Bramley [13]).
                                                          
1 The general policy prescribed to deal with positive (negative) spillovers is a matching grant (a tax)
provided by a higher layer of government (Dalhby [25]). Other possible methods to internalize
spillovers are boundary reforms, assignment of capacity to tax non-residents to the local government,
voluntary agreements and the creation of a higher-tier of local government that enforces cooperation
among communities (Haughworht [33]).
3However, some scepticism remains about the scale and importance of spillovers (Bramley
[13]). This may be due to the lack of empirical studies that verify the existence of spillovers in
the provision of local public services. Weisbrod [52] and Greene et al. [30] are some of the
few empirical studies on this topic. The first one estimates the extent to which local school
expenditures provide benefits to other communities via the migration of educated population.
He finds that school expenditures are lower in states with high rates of outmigration. The
second one quantifies the magnitude of benefit spillovers in Washington D.C., confirming the
relevance of the problem. There are also some papers dealing with spillovers in crime
prevention (Furlog and Mehay [28], Hakim et al. [32] and Heikkila and Kantiotou [34]) and
recreation (Bramley [13]). These papers provide evidence about the effects of some groups of
non-residents on the crime level or on the level of service utilisation in the community.
More recently,  some papers have developed specific tests of budget spillovers by looking for
interactions among the expenditure levels of neighbouring communities. See, for example,
Murdoch et al. [43] for a study of local recreation expenditures in the metropolitan area of
L.A., and Case et al. [18] for an analysis of the full range of expenditure categories of U.S.
state governments. The results of these papers confirm the relevance of interactions among
expenditure levels of neighbouring governments, but some doubts remain about its meaning.
For example, the positive interactions among expenditure levels found in both papers could
also be due to competition among jurisdictions for residents or businesses. This seems to be
reinforced in the Case et al. [18] study by the fact that states seem to react only to expenditure
changes of states with similar racial characteristics, and not to adjacent ones. But if spillovers
tent to arise as a consequence of some form of mobility or other (e.g., commuting and
commercial trips, crime migration or transboundary pollution), the degree of interaction
among governments should exhibit distance decay. Also, none of these studies cares about the
exact nature of the public services provided. Being these probably congestible, in the presence
of some sort of mobility, spillovers would manifest itself not only in the form of expenditure
4interactions, but also in the form of interactions from the neighbours’ demographic variables
to own expenditures.
The paper presents a model for measuring spillovers resulting from local expenditure policies.
The test of budget spillovers looks, as in the two aforementioned papers, for interactions
among expenditure levels, but introduce some improvements in the methodology. First, we
identify and test for three different types of budget spillovers: (i) benefit spillovers, derived
from the production of local public goods, (ii) externalities in crowding, derived from the
crowding of facilities by residents in neighbouring jurisdictions, and (iii) externalities derived
from the effects of expenditure competition. Benefit spillovers are accounted for by assuming
that the representative resident enjoys the consumption of a local public good both in his
community and in the surrounding ones. Externalities in crowding are included by
considering that the service outcomes of a locality are influenced by demographic variables of
the surrounding localities. These spillovers translate to a demand function with interactions
among local governments occurring not only between expenditure levels (benefit spillovers)
but also from neighbours’ demographic variables to own expenditures (externalities in
crowding). Spillovers from expenditure competition effects arise in the special case of
expenditure interaction with congestible goods, but without externalities in crowding (that is,
the good is congestible but there is only crowding by residents).
Second, we test for spillovers across the full range of expenditure categories of the local
governments in our sample, not just one category. Third, we take into account that, partly
because of low mobility costs, benefit spillovers are a natural phenomena in large
conurbations, where jurisdiction boundaries are unlikely to match natural catchment zones for
different types of activity. Small jurisdictions in metropolitan areas are more likely to
experience high rates of spillin and central cities are a particular source of some types of
spillover. Policy prescriptions to overcome the lack of cooperation among local governments
will thus be specially useful in the case of metropolitan areas, as it has been properly
5illustrated in a recent paper by Haughworth [33]. This leads us to test the model with a cross-
section of data from the municipalities belonging to the metropolitan area of Barcelona. In
addition to this, the focus on that sample allows us to use a very rich data set, combining
census data with data on local government finances coming from a special survey undertook
by a higher-tier of local government. Most of the data used to properly account for budget
spillovers (e.g., commuters, over-night visitors and employment) is unique to the sample,  and
is not available for the remaining Spanish local communities.
The remainder of the paper is organised into four sections. In the next section, we present the
theoretical framework that allows us to develop a typology of spillovers and derive the
empirical predictions. This is followed by a discussion of the estimation procedure and the
data set used with this purpose. The results and some concluding remarks are given in the
final two sections.
2. BUDGET SPILLOVERS: A TYPOLOGY
Following Conley and Dix [20], we identify two main types of budget spillovers. On the one
hand, there are spillovers of local public goods, with no externalities in crowding, occurring
when a fraction of the local public good produced in on jurisdiction is experienced by
surrounding jurisdictions, and is a perfect substitute for their own provision of public goods.
The example of radio or TV broadcasting fits well this category, named ‘benefit spillovers’
from now on. On the other hand, there are also ‘externalities in crowding’, that are not
consequence from the provision of public goods, but from the crowding of facilities by
residents in neighbouring jurisdictions. The crowding of museums and parks by commuters
and other visitors is a typical example of this externality. If the good is congestable, both
types of spillovers could appear at the same time. In addition to these two categories, it would
be worthwhile to include a third one, named spillovers arising from ‘expenditure competition
effects’. In that case, the externality is prompted by the change in the residence of some
6groups of population in response to policy differences (e.g., welfare recipients in the case of
provision of social services).
In the remaining of this section we will develop some theoretical arguments in order to
differentiate the empirical predictions coming from the three different types of spillovers. The
concrete specification of each type of spillover is built in a simple model of public good
provision, that combines a demand of service provision (the same for each case) with a
technology of public good supply (that differs according the type of spillover).
2.1 Basic demand model
The decision of the local government on the amount of a good to provide can be modelled as
an utility maximisation problem. We shall assume that the local government maximises the
utility of a representative resident. This procedure can be justified by invoking the median
voter model (see Mueller [42], pp. 64-66) or a welfare maximisation approach (see Wildasin
[53], pp. 44). In any case, it should become clear that this procedure is merely instrumental,
with the purpose to derive some testable predictions regarding the effect of spillovers. More
formally, let the preferences of the representative resident of locality i be represented by a
strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave, and twice continuously differentiable function (Ui):
Ui(xi, oi). Where xi is the private good and oi is the level of service or outcome. Let us assume
that the level of service or outcome achieved in the locality i (oi) depends on the activity or
output provided by the local government (ai), on the number of users of that service (ui), and
on a variety of exogenous cost drivers (zi),
                                                              oi=fi(ai, ui, zi)                                                              (1)
where ∂fi/∂ai ≥0, ∂fi/∂ui ≤0 and ∂fi/∂zi ≤0. This equation determines the supply technology of
the public good and allows for different degrees of publicity of the service provided. If ∂fi/∂ui
=0 the service is a pure public good, since the outcome enjoyed does not depend on the
number of users, oi=fi(ai, zi). The pure private good case occurs when ∂fi/∂ui = - ai/ui, since a
7proportional variation in the level of output and the number of users keeps unchanged the
outcome enjoyed, oi=fi(ai/ui, zi).
Let’s assume also for simplicity that the output is produced under constant returns to scale
technology. In this case, the total cost or expenditure (gi) is equal to the (constant) per unit
cost (ci) times the level of output (ai): gi=ci.ai. Now, substituting ai in (1), we are able, by the
implicit function theorem, to write the cost function,
                                                              gi=hi(oi, ui, zi, ci)                                                         (2)
where ∂hi/∂oi≥0, ∂hi/∂ui≥0, ∂hi/∂zi≥0 and ∂hi/∂ci ≥0. The representative resident must choose
the utility maximising level of outcome subject to the cost of supplying public goods (2) and
his budget constraint, yi  = xi  - τi (gi - si), where yi is the income of the representative resident,
τi is the share of that resident in the tax bill of his locality, and si are lump-sum grants and
other exogenous revenues received by the local government. Around the point that optimally
solves the first order condition, the implicit function theorem allows us to write the reduced-
form demand for the public outcome,
                                                        oi= oi(τi ∂gi/∂oi ; yi  + τi si)                                                (3)
where ∂oi/∂(τi∂gi/∂oi) is composed of an income effect (positive/negative) and a substitution
effect (negative) and we generally expect a negative sign. The sign expected for ∂oi/∂(yi +τi si)
is positive in the case of a normal good. Due to the lack of appropriate measures of public
outcomes, the model is usually estimated with expenditure data. By substituting  ∂gi/∂oi in (3)
and the results again in (2) we are able to obtain the reduced form expenditure function,
                                                      gi=gi(ui, zi, ci, τi, yi   + τi si)                                                  (4)
8where ∂gi/∂(yi+τisi)≥0 and provided that the demand for the outcome is price-inelastic
∂gi/∂ui≥0, ∂hi/∂zi≥0 and ∂hi/∂ci ≥02. Since the seminal papers of Borcheding and Deacon [10]
and Bergstroom and Goodman [8], many papers have estimated, after choosing appropriate
functional forms for equations (1) and (3), demand equations like (4)3. This model will serve
as a baseline for the spillover-augmented expenditure equations.
                                              2.2 Benefit spillovers
Benefit spillovers have been traditionally modelled as arising from public good provision. To
illustrate this case we shall assume that the representative resident enjoys the benefits of
services provided by his community and a portion (φi -i) of the benefits of services provided
by neighbouring communities (Murdoch et al. [43]). The linearity of the benefits in the own
and neighbouring communities reflects the perfect substitutability among both types of
benefits. The benefits achieved in each community depend on the level of output, users and
cost drivers therein. Denoting with i and –i, the values of the community and its neighbours,
we can write the supply technology as,
                                      oi=fi(ai, ui, zi) + φi -i• f-i(a-i, u-i, z-i)                                         (5)
where ∂fi/∂ai≥0, ∂fi/∂ui≤0 and ∂fi/∂zi≤0. In the case of a positive spillover, ∂f-i/∂a-i≥0, ∂f-i/∂u-i
≤0 and ∂f-i/∂z-i≤0; and, in the case of a negative spillover, ∂f-i/∂a-i≤0, ∂f-i/∂u-i≥0 and ∂f-i/∂z-i
≥0. Recalling that gi=ci.ai and g-i=c-i.a-i, and substituting ai and a-i in (5), we are able to write
the cost function,
                                                     gi=hi(oi, ui ,zi, ci; g-i, u-i, z-i, c-i )                                         (6)
                                                          
2The signs of ∂gi/∂ui≥0 and ∂hi/∂zi≥0 can be reversed if there is a high degree of substitutability
between xi and oi. However, the concrete functional forms chosen to estimate demand equations do not
allow for complementary/substitutability effects among public and private goods. But, since the sign
obtained in these studies for ∂gi/∂ui and ∂hi/∂zi tend to be the positive and the demand is price-
inelastic, it seems that the substitutability effect does not empirically dominate the direct cost effect.
3 Other examples are Schwab and Zampelli [50], Ladd and Yinger [40] and Duncombe [26].
9where ∂hi/∂oi≥0, ∂hi/∂ui≥0, ∂hi/∂zi≥0 and ∂hi/∂ci ≥0. If the spillover is positive, ∂hi/∂g-i ≤0,
∂hi/∂u-i≥0 and ∂hi/∂z-i≥0; and if the spillover is negative, ∂hi/∂g-i≥0, ∂hi/∂u-i≤0 and ∂hi/∂z-i≤0.
The direct estimation of equation (6) would provide evidence on benefit spillovers. However,
due to lack of outcome data, the usual procedure is to estimate a reduced form expenditure
function. The derivation of the expenditure function is similar to the previous case, but an
important difference has to be noted. Given the interjurisdictional public good characteristics
of the cost function (6), an assumption must be made about the behaviour of each local
government vis-à-vis the other local governments. It is common in this case to assume that
each local community behaves Nash; that is, considers as fixed the supply of public goods by
other jurisdictions. Although there could be other possible behaviours, the Nash assumption
has been widely used in the literature on public goods provision (see, e.g., Cornes and Sandler
[21]). Thus, after following the same steps than in section 2.1, and assuming Nash behaviour,
we obtain an expenditure function comparable to (4),
                                         gi=gi(ui, zi, ci, τi, yi  + τi si,; g-i, u-i, z-i, c-i,)                                     (7)
where, provided that demand is price inelastic, ∂gi/∂g-i≤0, ∂gi/∂u-i≥0, ∂gi/∂z-i≥0 and ∂gi/∂c-i
≥0,  if the spillover is positive; and ∂gi/∂g-i≥0, ∂gi/∂u-i≤0, ∂gi/∂z-i≤0 and ∂gi/∂c-i≤0,  if the
spillover is negative. In the case of a positive spillover, ∂gi/∂g-i≤0 reflects the classical free-
riding effect, while in the of case of a negative spillover, ∂gi/∂g-i≥0 reflects the need to
compensate the adverse effects of neighbours’ policies4. Equation (7) will be estimated in
section 3 after choosing an appropriate functional form for the supply technology relation (5).
                                                          
4The sign of ∂gi/∂g-i could also be reversed if there is a high degree of substitutability between xi and
oi. However, note that if this is the case, also the signs of ∂gi/∂u-i and  ∂gi/∂z-i should also be reversed.
Thus, if (provided that the demand is price-inelastic) we check that these variables have the same sign
as in the cost equation (in general, we expect them to be positive cost drivers), the sign of ∂gi/∂g-i will
be the one expected (negative/positive for a positive/negative spillover).
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                                        2.3 Crowding externalities
These externalities occur when non-residents come to the locality and use the services
provided therein. If the good is congestable, the use by non-residents reduces the outcome
experienced by residents. In this case, we shall assume that the number of users of the service
(ui) depend on the size of some socio-demographic groups in the community (ni) and in the
surrounding communities (n-i), ui=ui(ni,n-i), where ∂ui/∂ni≥0 and ∂ui/∂n-i≥0. That is, the
populations living in the vicinity tend to travel to the community i (e.g., to work, study or
shop) and make some use of the public services provided therein. We shall further assume
that the decisions of the commuters to use public services in the workplace is simply a matter
of opportunity and is, thus, exogenous. In this case the outcome provided can be expressed as,
                                                              oi=fi(ai, ni, n-i, zi)                                                         (8)
where ∂fi/∂ai≥0, ∂fi/∂ni≤0, ∂fi/∂ni≤0 and ∂fi/∂zi≤0. After following the same steps than in
section 2.1, we obtain an expenditure function comparable to (4),
                                                    gi=gi(ni, n-i, zi, ci, τi, yi  + τi si)                                              (9)
where, provided the demand is price-inelastic, ∂gi/∂ni≥0 and ∂gi/∂n-i≥0, and the remaining
coefficients show the same results than in section 2.1. Equation (9) will be estimated in
section 3 after choosing an appropriate functional form for the supply technology relation (8).
The models represented by expenditure equations (5) and (9) are by no means incompatible.
Except in the case of no-congestion (i.e., ∂oi/∂ui=∂o-i/∂u-i=0 in (5)), benefit spillovers and
crowding externalities may appear simultaneously. In fact, if residents crowd public services
(∂oi/∂ui≥0) and there are benefit spillovers (φi -i≠0), why should not non-residents also crowd
public services?. Thus, the equation to be estimated in section (3) allows for the possibility
that both kinds of spillovers appear at the same time.
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2.4 Competition effects
Fiscal competition constitutes in itself a potential alternative explanation of interactions
among expenditure policies of local governments. For example, local governments may fear
that low relative levels of productive expenditure will drive out business, or that high relative
levels of social expenditure will attract welfare recipients. In this case, they will match the
spending increases of neighbour communities with own spending increases. This is in fact the
prediction of the model of capital tax competition developed by Wildasin [54] and tested by
Buettner [17]. This author finds a positive interaction among capital tax rates of Western
Germany neighbouring communities. Empirical analysis of welfare competition also tent to
find a positive interaction between benefit levels of neighbouring communities, although the
theory gives no a priori prediction for the sign of the reaction (see, e.g., Saavedra [49]).
The interaction among expenditure levels could also arise as a result of ‘yardstick
competition’ (Besley and Case [9]). This happens when voters evaluate the performance of
local incumbents relative to the performance achieved by local governments in comparable
communities. If this is the case, incumbents may choose not to deviate from the policies
undertook by neighbours in order to remain in office. Spending increases/ decreases by a local
government will tent to be followed by local governments in the neighbourhood5.
Thus, both fiscal competition and ‘yardstick competition’ theories generate a positive pattern
of interactions among expenditure levels. In order to disentangle benefit spillovers from
competition effects we have to make a more subtle argument, based on the public good
characteristics of the service analysed. In the congestable good case, it is not likely that
benefit spillovers come independently from crowding externalities. Thus, when the service
analysed is not a pure public good, the absence of crowding externalities will indicate that
                                                          
5 Some recent papers have found evidence of mimicking behaviour in local tax setting, see Ladd [39]
and Besley and Case [9].
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competition effects are a plausible explanation for interactions. If the service is a pure public
good, both competition effects and benefit spillovers may provide the explanation needed to
justify expenditure interactions.
                                               3. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
                               3.1 Specification of the expenditure equation
The estimated expenditure equation is obtained after posing specific functional forms for the
supply technology of public goods and the outcome demand function. The functional forms
chosen are in the vein of the classical papers of Borcheding and Deacon [10] and Bergstrom
and Goodman [8] and, thus, the demand equation proposed can be considered as an
augmented version of these classical approaches. The concrete parameterisation of the model
has the advantage of allowing precise testing of different hypothesis, from the degree of
publicity to the nature of spillovers.
Let’s assume a very general supply technology, that encompasses all possible budget
spillovers identified in section 2,
                                  )WW(W)( iiiiiii zˆ.uˆ.aˆzˆ.uˆ.aˆoˆ σ−ε−φ+σ−ε−=                                   (10)
Where (^) indicates that the variables are taken in logs, and W indicates that the variable has
been calculated as a weighted average of all the communities to the exception of community i.
The weights in W indicate the degree of connectivity or relationship among two communities
and are (in general, although not necessarily) related to the geographic distance between them.
We postpone a more detailed explanation of the specification of W to the next section. The
parameters ε and σ quantify the impact of users and other cost drivers, respectively, on the
level of service or outcome achieved. The coefficient ε is known in the literature as the
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‘congestion parameter’ and measures the degree of publicness of the service provided (i.e.,
ε=0 identifies a pure public good while ε=1 identifies a private good)6,7.
Most studies of local public good congestion concentrate on the effect of the overall
population of the level of outcome achieved. However, as (Wildasin [53], pp. 33) points out,
the extent of crowding by different population groups may not be the same. In addition to
that, being the purpose to  estimate crowding externalities, non-residents must be included
among the groups of users. We shall also assume that there are different groups of potential
users of the service. For simplicity, let’s write the number of users of i as a weighted sum of
the general population (ni) and other socio-specific demographic groups (nk,i), and some
groups of non-residents visitors (ei , e.g., commuters, over-night visitors, and commercial
employment). That is, the number of users may be written as ui=ni+γ.nk,i+δ.ei. Using the fact
that ln(1+a)≅a when a is small, we obtain )n/e.()n/n.(nˆuˆ iiii,kii δ+γ+= .
Thus, this simple specification of ui accounts for the presence of crowding externalities.
However, the non-resident variables included may not account for all possible forms of
mobility. They do not pick, for example, the effects of mobility derived from leisure or crime
behaviour. A more general specification of ui will thus be used, adding the population and
various socio-demographic groups of the neighbour communities, (W inˆ  and Wnk,i),
                                                          
6 Most of the empirical studies (see Reiter et al. [47] for a review) have found most local services to be
quasi-private. As these authors discusse, there may be various flaws in the specifications that account
for this result, but some of them derive from the omission of variables included in the equation
estimated in this paper (e.g., higher responsibilities of big cities, crowding by non-residents).
7The specific functional form used to account for congestion has been criticised on the grounds that it
exhibits constant marginal congestion, and not increasing marginal congestion (Brueckner [14] and
Craig [23]), as Buchanan’s club theory specifies (Buchanan [15]). However, functional forms
consistent with increasing marginal congestion are non-linear and not amenable to the econometric
techniques used in the paper; also, on empirical grounds, the superiority of this non-linear
specification has been questioned by some papers (Means and Mehay [41]).
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                         )/W(W.W)()( ik,iiiiii,kii nnnˆn/e.n/n.nˆuˆ µ+η+δ+γ+=                            (11)
Finally, we shall pose a log-linear demand function for the level of outcome,
                                 ))(ln()ln( iiiiiii n/sy.o/g.nˆ.aˆoˆ θ+β+∂∂α−α+=                               (12)
Where θ allows for the possibility that lump-sum grants have degree of fungibility different
from that of personal income and shows the presence of fiscal illusion8. Substituting (11) in
(10) and using iii aˆcˆgˆ += and iii aˆcˆgˆ WWW += we may obtain the cost function that,
combined with (12), will yield the following reduced form expenditure function:
                
)W(WW
W)W(WW)W(W
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nˆgˆ
−++
++++
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+++++
=−
−−−
                                 (13)
Where )( ii nˆgˆ −  and )W(W ii nˆgˆ − are the logs of per capita expenditures of the community i
and its neighbours, respectively. This is a spillover-augmented version of the more traditional
demand or expenditure equations of Borcheding and Deacon [10] or Bergstrom and Goodman
[8]. To obtain the basic expenditure equation  the coefficients a4 and a5, and a10 to a15 must be
set to zero.
Equation (13) provides the general specification that will be used in order to test for the
different types of spillovers. Note that the different spillover models presented in Section 2
are embodied in equation (13). The model with ‘externalities from crowding’ is obtained
when a3, a4 or a5 are different from zero, and when a10 to a15 are zero. In addition to that, for
the model of crowding externalities to have economic sense, the congestion parameter has to
                                                          
8 See Turnbull [51] for an empirical test based on this non-linear specification; Courant et al. [22] and
Oates [45] are classical papers on  the ‘flypaper effect’, and Bailey and Connoly [7] provide a survey
of the literature.
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be different from zero (ε>0). This condition can be checked from the coefficients a1 and a7,
since ε=(a1/a7)+1.
The model with ‘benefit spillovers’ (but no crowding externalities) is obtained when the
coefficients a10 to a15 are different from zero, when a2 and a4 are zero, and when the good is
not congestible (ε=0). If all these conditions hold but the good is congestible, competition
externalities may be present. If a10 to a15 and a3, a4 or a5 are different from zero, benefit
spillovers and crowding externalities are present at the same time. The model is also capable
to identify the sign of the benefit spillover. When the demand is price-inelastic (α<1), benefit
spillovers are positive/negative if a15 is negative/positive and a9 to a14 are negative/positive.
The signs are reversed when the demand is price-elastic (α>1). However, in any case, it is
possible to ascertain the sign of the spillover; the reason is that the spillover (φ) parameter, the
price elasticity (α) and the other parameters of the model) are completely identified (see
Annex 1).
                                                   3.2 Econometric approach
Equation (13) indicates that the local choices of expenditure levels are interdependent. This
implies that the expenditure per capita in a given community depends on the expenditure per
capita in a set of alternative communities. In addition to that, expenditure per capita also
depends on demographic variables and cost drivers in this set of alternative communities.
These variables enter equation (13) multiplied by W; as we stated at the beginning of section
3.1, this operator indicates that the variable has been calculated as a weighted average of all
the communities to the exception of community i. For example, in the case of igˆ ,
                         ∑
≠
ω=
ij
ji gˆgˆ ijW            and                 ∑
≠
=ω
ij
ijij w/wij                             (14)
Where ωij is the weight of community j in the set of alternative communities of i. For
technical reasons these weights tent to be standardised (Anselin [2]) and, thus, add to one. For
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empirical testing of the model it is imperative to be more concrete about which communities
most likely engage in spillover interactions. Admittedly, as (Anselin [2]) points out, the
selection of weights in this kind of analysis is somewhat arbitrary. As we have stated
previously, budget spillovers tent to arise as a result of some form of mobility between local
communities. Therefore, the scope of that mobility will define the connectivity among
communities and the weights used in (14). In the case of local services in a metropolitan area,
the distances travelled for most relevant forms of mobility (e.g., commuting, and leisure and
commercial travelling9) are quite short. For example, the median commuting distance in the
municipalities of the sample is about 15 km10. Therefore, there is a fundamental theoretical
justification to expect that geographical proximity matter in our case.
We will define four different sets of weights. The first two sets of weights are based on pure
proximity criteria. Binary weights are defined as wij=1 if radial distance between two
communities is lower than 15 km and wij=0 otherwise
11. Inverse of squared distance weights
are defined as wij=1/dij
2 where dij is the radial distance between two communities. There are
two other sets of weights that combine proximity with the size of surrounding communities.
Population binary weights are defined as wij=nj if radial distance between two communities is
lower than 15 km and wij=0 otherwise, where nj is the resident population of community j.
Finally, population inverse of squared distance weights are defined as wij=nj/dij
2. These
weights reflect the asymmetric impact of an expenditure change in big and small communities
over the level of spillovers experienced by the rest of the metropolitan area12.
                                                          
9 Recall that all these forms of mobility are included among the variables accounting for non-resident
user groups in equation (13).
10 This distance has been calculated using a commuting matrix for all the municipalities in the sample;
data on commuting comes from the 1996 census.
11 Binary weights with higher distances (20 and 30 km) did not perform as well as this one in the
empirical analysis.
12 That is, for example, if a big community increases the level of per capita expenditure, a huge
number of residents in the rest of the metro area (that, for example, work in that community) will
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As we have previously stressed, equation (13) embodies different budget spillover models.
The ‘crowding externalities’ model can be obtained by setting the coefficients a10 to a15 to
zero. In this case, the only variables from surrounding communities that are included in the
equation are the neighbours’ demographic variables )W  Wand  (W ii,ki n/nnˆ . The coefficients
of these variables, jointly with those of the variables included in ei (e.g., commuters, over-
night visitors and commercial employment) will identify the externalities from crowding. The
inclusion in equation (13) of these neighbours’ demographic variables does not pose any
econometric problem. Therefore, if this is the suitable specification of budget spillovers, we
will be able to consistently estimate all the parameters by ordinary least squares (OLS).
The ‘benefit spillovers’ model expands the previous model to include all the neighbours’
variables. Of special interest in this case is the parameter of the neighbours’ expenditure
)W(W ii nˆgˆ − .The inclusion of this variable introduces a specific simultaneity problem, which
is well established in the spatial econometrics literature (Anselin [2]). This specification is
known in the econometrics literature as the spatial lag model and; since )W(W ii nˆgˆ −  is
correlated with the residuals, can not be consistently estimated using OLS. The maximum
likelihood estimation (ML) of the spatial lag model will provide consistent estimates of the
unknown parameters (see Anselin [2])13. A standard test of spatial lag dependence is the
Anselin [3] test based on the Lagrange Multiplier principle (LMφ), that can be computed from
OLS residuals of the ‘crowding externalities’ model.
But both the ‘crowding externalities’ and the ‘benefit spillovers’ models may suffer from an
additional econometric problem. It may happen that the expenditure policies of adjacent local
                                                                                                                                                                                    
experience the increased level of provision. Also, if use is endogenous, an expenditure decrease in a
big city will push off a big number of users. These effects have been recognised in recent papers
dealing with asymmetric tax competition (see Kanbur and Keen [36] and Hoyt [35]).
13This is the most common procedure to estimate equation (13). Alternatively, equation (13) may be
estimated by instrumental variables (see Anselin [2], ch. vii, and Kelejian and Prucha [38]).
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governments may be affected by common shocks. If this is the case, the error term (ζ) may
exhibit spatial autocorrelation (i.e, ζ=λ.ζ+ξ, where ξ is a well behaved error term). This
model is known in the econometrics literature as the spatial error model. The OLS estimation
of the model is no longer efficient and ML estimation has to be used again. The presence of
spatial error autocorrelation can be tested by using a Lagrange Multiplier test (LMλ) that can
also be computed from the OLS residuals (see Burridge [16]). In practice, the OLS residuals
of the ‘crowding externalities’ model may exhibit both kinds of misspecification. In this case,
the standard LMφ and LMλ tests of Anselin [3] and Burridge [16] loose power. Instead, the
robust LMφ* and LMλ* developed by Anselin et al. [4] should be used.
In case of presence of both kinds of spatial dependence an additional problem arises, since the
maximum likelihood function suffers from identification problems (Anselin [2] and Anselin
et al. [4]). The approach used in the paper to overcome this problem is to separately estimate
both models by ML when the LMφ* and LMλ*  tests suggest so, and to perform some
additional tests using the ML results. These tests are a Likelihood Ratio test on the spatial
autorregresive coeficient, both for the spatial lag and spatial error models, and a test on the
‘common factor hypothesis’ (Anselin [2] and Burridge [16]) that indicates whether the spatial
lag or the spatial error model is appropriate14.
                                         3.3 Variables and data
The empirical implementation of the model has been carried out with a cross-section of data
from the municipalities belonging to the metropolitan area of Barcelona for the year 1996.
The sample includes 104 municipalities ranging from 5.000 to 250.000 inhabitants15. All of
                                                          
14 Alternative approaches are the estimation of the joint model imposing some restrictions, as in Case
et al. [19], or to use the GMM estimation approach of Kelejian and Prucha [39].
15 Note that the central city,  Barcelona, as been excluded from the sample, on the grounds of the very
specificity of its status. However, the city has been included into the set of neighbour’s of its
surrounding localities.
19
them are located to less that 80 km of the central city, Barcelona. Different kinds of mobility
are widespread in the area, and problems related with spillovers are folk wisdom and a source
of political concern. Also an early experience of a general metropolitan government existed in
the area during the 80’s, but political conflict with the regional government prompted its
demise. By now, metropolitan co-operation is restricted to the fields of transportation and
water delivery, but a proposal to extend it to other fields still exists.
Six different expenditure equations have been estimated: (i) General administration, (ii)
Police, (iii) Social services, (iv) Cultural and Sports facilities, (v) Housing, Town building,
and Parks and Streets maintenance, and (vi) Street cleaning, Water delivery and Sanitation.
These categories cover the full range of expenditure categories that are responsibility of
Spanish local governments and represent more than a 90% of total operating expenditure16.
These categories are also representative of the responsibilities that municipalities use to have
elsewhere, to the notable exception of the lack of education expenditure.
To estimate the model motivated by equation (13) we need measures of gi, ni, nk,i, ei, zi, ci, yi ,
si and some other variables that control for economic, institutional and political influences on
local expenditure not included in (13). The information used comes from various sources,
mainly from the 1996 census but also from municipal budgets and other administrative
sources. The dependent variable (gi) is measured as operating expenditure outlays for the year
1996 (i.e., wages, supplies and transfers), excluding thus the more volatile capital
expenditure. The source of budgeting information is a special survey conducted each year by
a higher-tier local government (Diputación de Barcelona).
                                                          
16 The weights of these categories in the total operating expenditure of local governments are:
(i)=29.28, (ii) 10.46, (iii)=13.25,  (iv)=9.78, (v)=15.15 and (vi)=14.55. The remaining 8% correspond
to small categories excluded because some of the municipalities of the sample do not have expenditure
responsibilities in these areas.
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The size of the resident population (ni) and other demographic variables (nk,i) are taken from
the 1996 Census. These variables include: population under age 18, over age 65 and aged 18-
40, number of graduates, number of old houses (i.e., build before 1950). Poverty or
deprivation has been measured by two indices, the Index of Economic Deprivation and the
Index of Social Deprivation. These indices have been constructed by carrying a factor
analysis over a set of variables that pick up various dimensions of poverty17. The Index of
Economic Deprivation includes (with the same weights): the number of unemployed, the
number of illiterate people and the number of welfare recipients. The Index of Social
Deprivation includes (with the same weights): the number of taxpayers under a given level of
taxable income, the number of lone-parent families and the number of immigrants. The
variables are from the 1996 Census to the exception of welfare recipients (Dep. of Social
Welfare of the Regional government) and taxpayers by income level (Tax Administration).
The variables picking up the size of various groups of non-resident users (ei) are: number of
commuters, number of over-night visitors and employment in the commercial retail sector.
Information on commuters and employment come from the 1996 Census while the over-night
visitors are own estimates of the Dep. of Regional Planning of the Regional government. It
has to be emphasised that this information is not available for most of the remaining Spanish
municipalities. The reason is that questions relating the origin and destination of jobs are only
included in the Census for the municipalities belonging to big metropolis.
Cost drivers (zi) must include all the influences on the cost of providing public outputs related
to fixed characteristics of the territory served (e.g., climate, building styles, travel costs,
settlement patterns, etc.). The effect of settlement patterns of the costs of providing public
goods has been well documented, but the characterisation in just one variable is difficult (see
Ellis-Williams [27] and Bramley [13]). We have included in this category three variables that
                                                          
17 See Chapman [19] for a similar approach applied to English local governments.
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attempt to measure the settlement pattern of the population: developed area per capita,
dispersed population (i.e., living outside the main urban centre of the municipality), and
isolated population (i.e., living in non-urbanised areas). The information come also from the
1996 Census and, in the case of developed area, from the Dep. of Regional Planning of the
Regional government. The cost of providing one unit of output (ci) is measured as a Divisia-
type index of input costs (Schwab and Zampelli [50]). Problems of data preclude the inclusion
of factor costs other than wages in the index.
Differences in economic resources across communities are accounted for by including in the
equation the income per capita of the municipality (yi), as estimated from income tax
information by Arcarons et al. [5], and unconditional grants received by the municipality from
the central and the regional government (si). This information comes from the same budgetary
source as local expenditure. However, we believe that these variables do not pick up
accurately all the possibilities of raising revenue by Spanish municipalities. More than a half
of municipal revenues come from tax sources. But municipal taxes18 are not only related to
the income of residents in the municipality, but also to the economic activity therein.
Commuting and commercial trips mean that there may be a substantial degree of tax-
exporting. And, as the extent of tax-exporting and the level of budget spillovers are probably
correlated, it is necessary to control for tax-exporting in the expenditure equation (13) in order
to avoid biases in the spillover-related coefficients. Since data availability have precluded the
direct quantification of tax-exporting (as, for example, in Ladd and Yinger [39]), we have
employed a simpler procedure. We have included a variable, called potential revenues (pi), in
an expanded definition of the revenue resources of local governments: yi[1+θ.(si/yi)+ϕ.(pi/yi)]
where θ and ϕ are coefficients. Potential revenues are obtained by multiplying the average
effective tax rates in the sample for each figure by its tax base in each community and adding
                                                          
18 The main municipal taxes are a residential and business property tax, a business tax, a vehicle tax
and taxes on building activity.
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up for the different taxes. The information needed to calculate this index comes from the same
budgetary source as local expenditure.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics,
 1996 Cross-Section  (n=104).
Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min.
Expenditure per capita (i) (pta.) 13,940 6,046 41,072 4,227
Expenditure per capita (ii) (pta.) 5,442 2,716 20,174 6,187
Expenditure per capita (iii) (pta.) 8,227 4,719 25,486 1,254
Expenditure per capita (iv) (pta.) 6,648 2,974 14,810 2,655
Expenditure per capita (v) (pta.) 10,435 5,315 26,741 1,120
Expenditure per capita (vi) (pta.) 9,012 5,657 43,239 2,265
Population 27,544 41,952 255,050 4,937
Prop.  Population under age 18 (%) 24.280 2.500 30.282 12.700
Prop. Population above age 65 (%) 13.406 3.600 24.449 5.818
I. of Economic Deprivation (Index) 0.905 0.171 1.438 0.383
I. of Social Deprivation (Index) 1.041 0.410 3.958 0.546
Prop. Commuters (%) 15.230 6.546 76.224 2.032
Prop.  Overnight visitors (%) 10.354 22.702 129.451 0.000
Prop. Commercial employ. (%) 1.699 0.464 3.734 0.574
Input cost (Index) 1.000 0.179 1.560 0.470
Dev. Area per capita (m2) 2.355 2.408 4.130 1.138
Prop. Dispersed Population  (%) 1.776 1.627 8.677 0.000
Prop. Isolated Population (%) 1.994 3.030 20.769 0.000
Prop.  Population  Growth (%) 11.300 18.147 51.226 0.000
Income per capita (pta.) 1,649,987 409,661 3,597,764 1,138,891
Lump-Sump grants per capita (pta.) 17,943 3,300 34,260 8,519
Potential revenue per capita (pta.) 40,684 13,046 116,992 15,780
Index Ideology of Gov. -0.099 0.499 0.771 -0.750
Index Divided Gov. 0.307 0.348 1.000 0.000
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Other variables have been included to control for institutional and political factors that
influence local expenditures. We include the amount of specific grants per capita received by
the local government and, when available, the direct expenditure of other layers of
government in the municipality. Data on specific grants come from the aforementioned
budgetary sources and has the drawback of not being available by spending category. We also
control for the fact that some municipalities have some additional spending responsibilities.
For example, big municipalities have more responsibilities in social services and public
transport systems, and we control for this fact by including the number of specialised rooms
in social services and the number of km of bus service in categories (iii) and (v), respectively.
Data on these factors come from different Regional government departmental sources.
Finally, we include two political variables. The first one is and index of ideology of the
members of the local government. This index is calculated, following Gross and Sigelman
[31] and Cusack [24] as the product of the share of each political party in the local council by
and index of political ideology of this party, that takes values from –1 for left wing parties to
+1 for right wing parties. We include also an index of political fragmentation of the local
government, similar to that of Roubini and Sachs [48]19.
                                                     4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results of the ‘Crowding externalities model’ are presented in Table 2. In this model the
only spatially lagged variables included are those corresponding to socio-economic factors;
they are assumed to be picking up the effects of crowding by non-residents. Note that the sets
of cost variables named ‘Crowding by residents’ and ‘Crowding by non-residents: lagged
variables’ include the same list of variables. Note also that these sets do not include the same
variables in the different expenditure categories, but they reflect the most important factors in
                                                          
19 The index is 0 in the case of a majority government, 1/3 in the case of a two party coalition, 2/3 if
the coalition has more than two parties and 1 in the case of a minority government.
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each one. The results with the complete set of variables included in all the equations is shown
in Table A.1 in the Annex 2 (i.e., ‘Basic demand model’). Since there are not enough
theoretical criteria to guide the selection of own cost variables, the ones with high standard
errors in Table A.1 have not been included in the estimated equations of Table 2. Note,
however, that control variables, to the exception of those reflecting institutional factors,
remain in the equation regardless of statistical criteria. This is because these variables have
been included in the equations on clear theoretical grounds.
[Table 2 about here]
The results of Table A.1 also help us to decide which  weight matrix to use to compute the
spatially lagged variables. This table includes the robust LM tests suggested by Anselin et al.
[4] to check the presence of spatial autocorrelation. The calculations have been performed for
the four weights matrices presented in section 3.2: WI=binary weights, WII=inverse of square
distance weights, WIII=binary weighted by population,  WIV=inverse of square distance
weighted by population. The results suggests that the matrices WII and WIV perform better
that the other ones. Since weighting by population seems less appropriate for ‘Crowding
externalities’ that for ‘Benefit spillovers’, we compute the lagged variables included in all the
equations of Table 2 with WII. However, we also include in Table 2 the robust LM tests
computed with both sets of weights, WII and WIV.
The results of Table 2 are able to identify various sources of ‘Crowding externalities’. Some
of these congestion effects are identified through own variables: commuters create congestion
in four expenditure categories, (ii) and (iv) to (vi), commercial employment in three
categories, (ii), (iv) and (vi), and overnight visitors in two, (ii) and (vi). But also lagged
variables are statistically significant in some categories: measures of deprivation in categories
(ii) and (v), and total population or population subgroups in categories (ii) and (iv). However,
the robust tests of spatial dependence included at the bottom of Table 2 indicate that all of
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these equations are misspecified: the problem seems to be spatial error dependence in
categories (i) and (vi), and spatial lag dependence in categories (iii) and (v), while either
spatial error or spatial lag dependence could be present in categories (ii) and (iv).
The results of the ‘Benefit spillovers model’ are presented in Table 3. The coefficients
included for each category correspond to the ML estimation of the most appropriate
specification, either the spatial error or the spatial lag model. Recall that in the spatial lag
model, expenditure per capita and cost drivers of the neighbour communities are included in
the equation.  These are included in Table 3 in the group of variables (v), named ‘Budget
spillovers’. Note that these are included in italics when the coefficients do not belong to the
best model (i.e., when the results of the spatial error model have been presented). This group
of variables includes also the estimated coefficient of spatial error correlation; the coefficient
appears in italics when the remaining of coefficients belong to the spatial lag model.
[Table 3 about here]
The bottom of Table 3 shows the results of the ML tests performed in order to identify the
source of spatial dependence in the data. The LR tests on spatial error and lag dependence
show the same pattern than the robust LM tests of Table 2. The remaining doubts according
the source of spatial dependence in categories (ii) and (iv) are solved with the help of the LR
test on the common factor hypothesis. This tests indicates that spatial error dependence is the
main misspecification in the category (ii), while spatial lag dependence is the main problem in
category (iv).
The results of Table 3 confirm the expectations about the relevance of crowding externalities
in the different expenditure categories. Expenditures in police (ii) are higher in communities
with a lot of commuters, overnight visitors and commercial employment, but also in
communities surrounded by big neighbours and deprived populations. Expenditures in
Culture and Sports (iv) are higher in communities with commuters and commercial
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employment, but also in communities surrounded by young and educated populations.
Expenditures in Housing, Town building, and Parks and Streets maintenance (v) are higher in
communities with commuters surrounded by deprived populations. Finally, expenditures on
Street cleaning, Water delivery and Sanitation (vi) are higher in communities with
commuters, overnight visitors and commercial employment. Note that only the services in
categories (i) General Administration and (iii) Social Services are not congested by non-
residents. These results are similar to those obtained in the literature (see Hakim et al. [32] in
the case of Police expenditures and Bramley [13] in the case of Culture and Sports).
The results of Table 3 also allow us to conclude that interactions among expenditure levels of
neighbouring communities are present at least in three categories: (iii) Social Services, (iv)
Culture and Sports, and (v) Housing, Town building, and Parks and Streets maintenance.
Shocks common to nearby communities are present in the remaining four communities,
including category (ii) Police. We believe that these interactions indicate the presence of
‘Benefit spillovers’ only in the last two categories, while in the case of Social Services
interactions may be related to ‘Expenditure competition’. We reach this conclusion by joining
various pieces of evidence. First, note that the results of the model show that Social Services
is a publicly provided private good (i.e., the level of population is not statistically significant).
Second, although expenditure on this service is higher in communities with high proportions
of young, old and deprived populations, to be surrounded by communities with high
proportions of these population groups do not have any impact on expenditures. It is difficult
to believe that there could be benefit spillovers in a private good without crowding
externalities occurring at the same time. The only remaining explanation for expenditure
interactions is ‘Expenditure competition’, arising because local governments worry about the
possibility of attracting deprived population groups when increasing service quality. Third,
once the spatial lag model has been estimated, most of the population groups of nearby
communities appear with a negative sign (and some of them are statistically significant).
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Given that the coefficient of lagged expenditure per capita is positive, this may indicate that
expenditure per capita increases/decreases when the quality of service increases/decreases in
nearby communities, both because an increase/decrease in expenditures or because a
decrease/increase in the size of client groups and cost drivers.
The results regarding expenditure interactions can be compared to those found in the U.S.
literature. The magnitude of the spatial lag coefficient in the case of Social Services (iii) is
0.316, rather similar to the values estimated by Saavedra [49] in the case of AFDC benefit
competition and by Case et al. [18] in related expenditure categories. The sign of the spatial
lag coefficient is negative in the case of Culture and Sports (iv), and Housing, Town building,
and Parks and Streets maintenance (v), but its magnitude is similar: –0.353 and –0.364,
respectively. This negative sign can be interpreted as evidence of a classical free-riding effect
(i.e., as the increase in expenditure by nearby governments provide benefits to the residents,
there is no need to provide the same level of service than before), suggesting the existence of
a positive benefit spillover20. To our knowledge, this result can not be found in the other
papers in the literature, that use to found positive interaction effects (see Case et al. [18] and
Murdoch et al. [43]). Moreover, the interpretation of this results as a positive benefit spillover
is consistent with the crowding externalities found in these expenditure categories.
One may wonder if the results regarding budget spillovers are robust or, instead, are the result
of some omitted variable that accounts for relevant aspects of local budgeting. However, note
that the results have been obtained by specifying the spillovers model as embedded in a
classical demand equation. The coherence of the results regarding the main parameters of
                                                          
20 Of course, this prediction only hold in the theoretical model if some assumptions are made (i.e.,
inelastic demand and low degree of substitutability among public and private goods), but the results of
the equations presented in Table 3 suggest that this is so in practice: the coefficient of the Input cost
variable is positive and so the price-elasticity of demand (one minus this coefficient, see Annex 1) is
less than unity, and the coefficients of the other cost drivers (e.g., population subgroups, non-residents,
geographical cost factors) have the expected positive sign.
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interest of this equation should provide evidence of good specification of the complete model.
Note, for example, that both price and income elasticities are lower than unitiy, as is common
in this kind of analysis. The different cost drivers (aside those that mesure spillover effects)
that are statistically significant in the different equations are also consonant with the
expectations.
The effect of lump-sum grants on expenditure is very high. The estimated coefficient for s is
around 19; dividing this coefficient by the income elasticity we obtain the θ parameter, that
shows the degree of fiscal illusion. The value of this coefficient is thus around 31. This
indicates that an increase in income per capita of 30 peseta has the same effect than an
increase of grants of one peseta. Thus, the flypaper effect is very big in the Spanish case. This
result is consistent with those of some other studies (Turnbull [51] and Bailey and Connolly
[7]). The effect of potential revenues is also very high. The estimated coefficient for f is
around 11. After dividing this coefficient by the income elasticity we obtain the ϕ parameter.
The value of ϕ is around 18. Thus, and increase in income per capita of 18 peseta has the
same effect than an increase of potential revenues of one peseta.
The results identify economies of scale in consumption only in three spending categories,
General Administration (i), Culture and Sports (iv) and Housing, Town building, and Parks
and Streets maintenance (v), although in categories (i) and (v) the pure private good
hypothesis only can be rejected at the 85 and 90% confidence level, respectively21. This
limited evidence of economies of scale in consumption is consistent with the results shown in
some recent surveys on the topic (see, e.g., Reiter et al. [47]).
The equations presented in Table 3 also control for political and institutional details deemed
important for our analysis. Note that, as expected, higher responsibilities, that concentrate in
                                                          
21 The confidence interval for the crowding parameter ε depends on the standard error of the
population coefficient but also on the standard error of the input cost variable, quite high in general.
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categories (iii) and (v), imply higher expenditure per capita. In a similar fashion, higher
expenditure in the community by other layers of government allow the municipality to reduce
its expenditure in categories (iii), (v) and (vi), and Specific grants provide an important source
of finance in the case of Social Services (iii). The ideology of government is also important in
some services: left wing governments seem to spend more on General Administration (i) and
(v) Housing, Town building, and Parks and Streets maintenance, while right wing
governments spend more on Culture and Sports (iv).
Thus, the results provided in the paper are robust to the consideration of many of the facts that
define the financing and decision-making systems of Spanish local governments. This allows
us to reinforce the previous conclusion that the different types of budget spillovers analysed in
the paper are relevant to fully understand local public finance in metropolitan areas.
Moreover, spillovers are not only relevant, but also quantitatively important, a fact that can be
checked by having a look at the percentage of per capita expenditure variance explained by
the different groups of variables included in Table 3. The results of this analysis are presented
in Table 4 for each of the expenditure categories and for total expenditure.
[Table 4 about here]
Spillover-related variables explain a non-negligible share of the variance in per capita
expenditure. This share is around 20% in the case of total expenditure, but it is higher for
some expenditure categories: around 50% in the case of Culture and Sports (iv), and near 35%
in the cases of Police (ii) and Housing, Town building, and Parks and Streets maintenance (v).
On average, only the variables that measure fiscal capacity (e.g., per capita income, grants and
potential revenues) have a higher explanatory capacity that spillover-related ones (i.e., around
40%). Half of the explanatory power of spillover-related variables is due, on average, to own
variables and half to spatially lagged variables, confirming not only the need to account for
crowding but also the need to use spatial analysis to properly measure these effects.
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5. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a model for measuring spillovers resulting from local expenditure
policies. We have identified and tested for three different types of budget spillovers: (i)
benefit spillovers, derived from the production of local public goods, (ii) externalities in
crowding, derived from the crowding of facilities by residents in neighbouring jurisdictions,
and (iii) externalities derived from expenditure competition effects. Benefit spillovers have
been accounted for by assuming that the representative resident enjoys the consumption of a
local public good both in his community and in the surrounding ones. Externalities in
crowding are included by considering that the service outcomes of a locality are influenced by
demographic variables of the surrounding localities. The empirical approach of the paper has
consisted in specifying a classical demand function but expanded to take into account
interactions among local expenditure levels and interactions from neighbours’ demographic
variables to own expenditures.
The model has been tested for six different expenditure categories with a cross-section of data
from the municipalities belonging to the metropolitan area of Barcelona. The results are able
to identify externalities in crowding in spending on Police, Cultural and Sports facilities,
Parks and Streets maintenance, and Street cleaning, Water delivery and Sanitation. Positive
benefit spillovers appear in spending in Cultural and Sports facilities, and Parks and Streets
maintenance, providing evidence on free-rider behaviour on these kind of services. Spending
on Social services seems to be affected by competition externalities, while there is no
evidence of spillovers in the case of spending in General Administration.  In general, thus, the
results support the inclusion of interjurisdictional spillovers in demand equations, tough its
type and quantitative influence differs according the kind of service analysed.
The results are robust to the inclusion of many political and institutional controls that account
for specific details of Spanish local governments. Moreover, in some of the categories the
explanatory capacity of spillover-related variables is quite substantial. Of course it is not clear
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that the results obtained can be extended to other countries or even to other metropolitan areas
in Spain. First, it has to be noted that local governments in Spain are really fragmented; this
reality manifests  both in very small municipalities that are below any reasonable size and in
metropolitan areas where sometimes a different local government cares of each side of the
street. Second, this problem is even worse in the case of Barcelona, since its borders (to the
difference, for example, of the capital, Madrid) only cover the very central business district
and the regional government covers much more than the metropolitan area. Also, attempts to
achieve co-operation through a metropolitan government have failed historically. Thus, the
fact that there seem not to be institutions fighting the spillover problem may have helped us to
find evidence on its strength.
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Annex 1: Identification of the supply technology coefficients
The coefficients a0 to a13 that appear in the expenditure equation (13) are related to the ones in
the supply technology of public goods in the following manner,
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Annex 2: Results for the Basic demand model
Table A.1: Basic demand model. Cross-Section OLS estimation
 for 1996 (n=104).Dependent variable: Ln Expenditure per capita
Coefficient estimates(1) by expenditure category (2)
Explanatory variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
i) Crowding by residents
Ln Population -0.092
(-1.991)**
-0.024
(-0.302)
0.043
(0.313)
-0.084
(-2.644)**
-0.058
(-1.583)
  -0.001
 (-0.015)
Prop.  Population under age 18 0.007
(0.475)
0.014
(0.309)
0.056
 (2.926)**
0.053
 (3.321)**
0.025
(0.406)
  -0.033
 (-0.099)
Prop. Population above age 65 0.010
(0.331)
-0.006
(-0.156)
0.062
(3.543)**
0.007
(0.445)
0.002
(0.001)
  -0.061
 (-0.125)
Index of Economic Deprivation -0.010
(-0.065)
0.066
 (1.355)
0.082
(2.102)**
0.174
(1.923)*
0.132
(3.429)**
   0.062
  (0.551)
Index of Social Deprivation -0.026
(-0.135)
0.055
 (1.892)*
0.109
(1.779)*
-0.045
(-0.352)
0.033
(1.884)*
  -0.024
  (-0.058)
Prop. Population aged 18-40 --.--     --.-- --.--     --.-- 0.012
(1.434)
    --.--
Prop. Old Housing --.--     --.-- --.--     --.-- 0.300
(2.958)**
    --.--
Prop. Grad. Population --.-- --.--     --.-- 0.025
(1.894)*
--.--     --.--
ii) Crowding by non-residents
Prop. Commuters -0.014
(-0.025)
0.561
 (1.772)*
-0.114
(-0.058)
1.324
(3.784)**
0.994
(3.553)**
0.321
(1.214)
Prop.  Overnight visitors 0.105
(0.421)
0.270
(1.793)*
-0.028
(-0.096)
-0.039
(-0.041)
0.096
(0.763)
0.383
(2.245)**
Prop. Commercial employ. -0.005
(-0.058)
9.235
 (1.921)*
0.254
(0.368)
10.005
(1.784)*
0.047
(0.499)
13.121
(2.114)**
iii) Cost drivers
Ln Input cost 0.191
(1.650)*
0.213
 (2.311)**
0.337
(1.789)*
0.266
(1.668)*
0.190
(1.675)*
0.374
(1.763)*
Ln Dev. Area per capita 0.018
(1.775)*
0.016
(1.505)
0.027
(1.530)
-0.158
(-0.295)
-0.031
(-0.126)
0.019
(2.430)**
Prop. Dispersed Population 0.025
(1.909)*
-0.005
(-0.054)
0.025
(2.960)**
-0.012
(-0.497)
0.012
(0.269)
-0.014
(-0.023)
Prop. Isolated Population 0.001
(0.021)
-0.001
(-0.129)
-0.004
(-0.222)
-0.167
(-0.541)
-0.056
(-0.011)
0.014
(1.664)*
Prop.  Population  Growth 0.012
(2.016)**
-0.096
(-0.885)
-0.021
(-0.196)
-0.023
(-0.321)
0.021
(0.048)
-0.031
(-3.671)**
iv) Control variables
Ln Income per capita 0.680
(18.318)**
0.531
(21.543) **
0.348
(4.687)**
0.512
(14.976)**
0.624
(24.785)*
*
0.656
(10.903)**
Prop. Lump-Sump grants 27.101
(2.063)**
15.814
(1.849)*
17.919
(1.785)*
24.109
(2.521)**
25.364
(1.784)*
27.001
(1.025)
Prop.  Potential revenue 9.254
(3.210)**
14.004
(2.255)**
11.372
(4.023)**
15.860
(3.226)**
14.656
(1.995)*
13.553
(4.181)**
Ln Specific grants per capita 0.286
(0.548)
0.233
(0.355)
0.202
(4.771)**
0.030
(0.194)
0.064
(0.336)
0.475
(0.459)
Ln Higher Resp. Expend. per capita --.-- --.-- 0.877
(1.654)*
--.-- 0.865
(2.631)**
--.--
Ln Other Layers Expend. per capita --.-- --.-- -0.421
(-1.687)*
-0.041
(-0.465)
-0.037
(-1.774)*
-0.165
(-1.667)*
Index Ideology of Gov. -0.062
 (-1.617)*
-0.233
(-0.355)
0.034
(0.335)
0.115
(2.146)**
-0.019
(-1.845)*
0.192
(2.313)**
Index Divided Gov. 0.009
(1.267)
0.007
(0.284)
-0.029
(-0.774)
-0.072
(-3.067)**
0.021
(0.011)
0.015
(0.382)
37
Table A.1: (continued)
Expenditure category (2)Explanatory variables
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
R2 0.588 0.520 0.623 0.637 0.599 0.621
F test (cj=0, ∀j) 9.039
**  7.595** 6.093** 8.089** 7.768** 6.154**
Breusch-Pagan (Heterosked.) 11.034 11.227 9.944 5.649 11.235 5.102
Kiefer Salmon (Normality) 1.679 2.952 3.659 1.419 1.756 3.024
Robust tests of Spatial Dependence
LM Test of Spatial Lag. Depen. (WI)
(3) 2.018 3.584* 1.395 4.021** 0.748 0.021
LM Test of Spatial Error Depen. (WI) 0.078 6.181
** 0.015 3.664** 0.231 3.741*
LM Test of Spatial Lag. Depen. (WII) 2.220 3.451
* 4.562** 4.266** 3.662** 0.521
LM Test of Spatial Error Depen. (WII) 0.256 6.258
** 0.523 3.558** 0.540 3.834**
LM Test of Spatial Lag. Depen. (WIII) 2.359 4.102
* 2.136 4.446** 0.442 0.033
LM Test of Spatial Error Depen. (WIII) 0.224 7.036
** 0.024 3.845** 0.013 4.201**
LM Test of Spatial Lag. Depen. (WIV) 2.474 4.221
* 2.774* 4.511** 3.844** 0.666
LM Test of Spatial Error Depen. (WIV) 3.821
* 7.651** 0.601 3.955** 0.009 4.658**
Notes: (1)  t statistics are shown in brackets; * & **=significantly different from zero at the 90 and 95% levels.
(2)  Expenditure categories: (i) Administration, (ii) Police, (iii) Social services, (iv) Culture and Sports, (v)
Housing, Town building,  Parks and Streets maintenance, (vi) Street cleaning, Water delivery and Sanitation.
(3) Refers to the robust LM tests of Anselin et al. (1996); W is the matrix used to weight neighbours’ values of
each variable; WI=binary weights, WII=inverse of square distance weights, WIII=binary weighted by population,
WIV=inverse of square distance weighted by population.
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Table 2: Crowding externalities. Cross-Section OLS estimation
 for 1996 (n=104).Dependent variable: Ln Expenditure per capita
 Coefficient estimates(1) by expenditure category (2)Explanatory variables
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
i) Crowding by residents
Ln Population -0.073
(-1.998)**
--.-- --.-- -0.088
(-2.645)**
-0.063
(-1.786)*
--.--
Prop.  Population under age 18 --.-- --.-- 0.054
 (2.344)**
0.044
 (2.577)**
--.-- --.--
Prop. Population above age 65 --.-- --.-- 0.056
(2.772)**
--.-- --.-- --.--
Index of Economic Deprivation --.-- 0.056
 (2.081)**
0.081
(2.120)**
0.139
(1.391)
0.111
(2.663)**
--.--
Index of Social Deprivation --.-- 0.069
 (1.987)**
0.121
(1.705)*
--.-- 0.042
(1.956)**
--.--
Prop. Population aged 18-40 --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.011
(1.474)
--.--
Prop. Old Housing --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.132
(3.061)**
--.--
Prop. Grad. Population --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.021
(1.844)*
--.-- --.--
ii) Crowding by non-residents: own variables
Prop. Commuters --.-- 0.544
 (1.997)**
--.-- 1.123
(3.590)**
0.928
(3.893)**
0.178
(1.898)*
Prop.  Overnight visitors --.-- 0.255
(1.862)*
--.-- --.-- 0.114
(0.863)
0.389
(2.445)**
Prop. Commercial employ. --.-- 18.826
 (3.648)**
--.-- 6.805
(3.590)**
--.-- 11.003
(2.449)**
iii) Crowding by non-residents: lagged variables
W x  Population (3) 0.002
(0.315)
0.020
 (2.024)**
0.010
(0.301)
0.112
(0.206)
0.003
(0.049)
0.034
(0.236)
W x  Prop.  Population under 18 --.-- --.-- -0.019
(-1.325)
0.026
(3.731)**
--.-- --.--
W x  Prop. Population over 65 --.-- --.-- -0.011
(-1.208)
--.-- --.-- --.--
W x  I. of Economic Deprivation --.-- 0.068
(2.834)**
-0.021
(-0.421)
0.027
(0.108)
0.063
(2.258)**
--.--
W x I. of Social Deprivation --.-- 0.095
 (2.224)**
-0.136
(-1.509)
--.-- 0.029
(1.151)
--.--
W x  Prop. Population aged 18-40 --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -0.028
(-0.618)
--.--
W x  Prop. Old Housing --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.008
(0.145)
--.--
W x  Prop. Grad. Population --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.074
(1.743)*
--.-- --.--
iv) Cost drivers
Ln Input cost 0.199
(1.867)*
0.216
 (2.353)**
0.258
(1.336)
0.241
(1.442)
0.181
(1.901)*
0.344
(1.867)*
Ln Dev. Area per capita 0.017
(1.746)*
0.0225
(2.333)**
0.020
(1.836)*
--.-- --.-- 0.020
(2.373)**
Prop. Dispersed Population 0.027
(1.934)*
--.-- 0.027
(2.100)**
--.-- --.-- --.--
Prop. Isolated Population --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.013
(1.764)*
Prop.  Population  Growth 0.010
(2.002)**
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -0.030
(-3.887)**
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Table 2: (continued)
Coefficient estimates(1) by expenditure category (2)
Explanatory variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
v) Control variables
Ln Income per capita 0.669
(21.572)*
0.504
(25.224) **
0.389
(6.354)**
0.606
(12.867)**
0.687
(14.958)**
0.667
(11.261)**
Prop. Lump-Sump grants 21.362
(2.073)**
18.122
(2.234)**
20.269
(1.651)*
20.521
(1.566)
20.211
(1.741)*
29.286
(1.120)
Prop.  Potential revenue 11.125
(3.750)**
12.010
(2.444)**
8.423
(4.210)**
15.022
(3.024)**
11.835
(1.663)*
15.989
(4.225)**
Ln Specific grants per capita --.-- --.-- 0.274
(4.010)**
--.-- --.-- --.--
Ln Higher Resp. Expend. per capita --.-- --.-- 0.861
(1.864)*
--.-- 0.921
(2.123)**
--.--
Ln Other Layers Expend. per capita --.-- --.-- -0.551
(-1.234)
--.-- -0.033
(-1.780)*
-0.382
(-1.782)*
Index Ideology of Gov. -0.062
 (1.698)**
--.-- --.-- 0.109
(1.834)*
-0.023
(-2.311)
0.191
(2.354)**
Index Divided Gov. 0.010
(1.299)
--.-- --.-- -0.066
(-2.171)**
--.-- --.--
R2 0.578 0.611 0.631 0.621 0.645 0.640
F test (cj=0, ∀j) 12.346**  16.217** 9.890** 6.539** 13.709** 6.320**
Breusch-Pagan (Heterosked.) 5.954 9.935 11.219 9.981 2.854 5.857
Kiefer Salmon (Normality) 2.109 2.935 4.051 0.859 0.234 4.364
Robust tests of Spatial Dependence
LM Test of Spatial Lag. Depen.(WII)
(4) 1.509 3.198* 4.529** 4.638** 4.885** 0.116
LM Test of Spatial Error Depen. (WII) 2.556 5.442
** 0.168 4.561** 0.001 2.334
LM Test of Spatial Lag. Depen.(WIV) 2.214 3.265
* 3.709* 5.871** 4.125** 0.294
LM Test of Spatial Error Depen. (WIV) 3.728
* 6.550** 0.102 5.633** 0.001 3.814*
Notes: (1)  t statistics are shown in brackets; * & **=significantly different from zero at the 90 and 95% levels.
(2) Expenditure categories: (i) Administration, (ii) Police, (iii) Social services, (iv) Culture and Sports, (v) Housing,
Town building,  Parks and Streets maintenance, (vi) Street cleaning, Water delivery and Sanitation.
(3) W is the matrix used to weight neighbours’ values of each variable; the matrix used is WII=inverse of square
distance weights.
 (4) Refers to the robust LM tests of Anselin et al. (1996); W is the matrix used to weight neighbours’ values of each
variable; WII=inverse of square distance weights, WIV=inverse of square distance weighted by population.
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Table 3: Benefit spillovers, Cross-Section ML estimation
 for 1996 (n=104).Dependent variable: Ln Expenditure per capita
Coefficient estimates(1) by expenditure category (2)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)Explanatory variables
ML-Error(4) ML-Error ML-Lag ML-Lag ML-Lag ML-Error
i) Crowding by residents
Ln Population -0.071
(-2.045)**
--.-- --.-- -0.060
(-3.328)**
-0.073
(-2.279)**
    --.--
Prop.  Population under age 18 --.-- --.-- 0.065
 (2.616)**
0.043
 (2.870)**
--.--     --.--
Prop. Population above age 65 --.-- --.-- 0.078
(3.550)**
--.-- --.--     --.--
Index of Economic Deprivation --.-- 0.061
 (2.201)**
0.094
(2.321)**
0.138
(1.672)*
0.107
(2.898)**
    --.--
Index of Social Deprivation --.-- 0.047
 (1.996)**
0.109
(1.928)*
--.-- 0.075
(1.136)
    --.--
Prop. Population aged 18-40 --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.012
(1.687)*
    --.--
Prop. Old Housing --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.143
(3.484)**
    --.--
Prop. Grad. Population --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.026
(1.742)*
--.--     --.--
ii) Crowding by non-residents: own variables
Prop. Commuters --.-- 0.546
 (2.622)**
--.-- 1.135
(4.034)**
0.959
(4.289)**
0.332
(2.286)**
Prop.  Overnight visitors --.-- 0.159
(1.695)*
--.-- --.-- 0.125
(1.295)
0.288
(2.101)**
Prop. Commercial employ. --.-- 17.356
 (4.049)**
--.-- 10.554
(1.993)**
--.-- 13.310
(2.636)**
iii) Crowding by non-residents: lagged variables
W x  Population (3) 0.002
(0.274)
0.018
 (2.345)**
0.012
(0.355)
0.101
(0.233)
0.004
(0.110)
0.035
(0.230)
W x  Prop.  Population under 18 --.-- --.-- -0.031
(-2.131)**
0.014
(3.400)**
--.-- --.--
W x  Prop. Population over 65 --.-- --.-- -0.034
(-1.783)**
--.-- --.-- --.--
W x  I. of Economic Deprivation --.-- 0.046
(2.206)**
-0.022
(-0.621)
0.033
(0.308)
0.099
(2.331)**
--.--
W x I. of Social Deprivation --.-- 0.087
 (2.207)**
-0.054
(-1.735)*
--.-- 0.105
(1.153)
--.--
W x  Prop. Population aged 18-40 --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -0.025
(-0.306)
--.--
W x  Prop. Old Housing --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.009
(0.161)
--.--
W x  Prop. Grad. Population --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.013
(3.251)*
--.-- --.--
iv) Cost drivers
Ln Input cost 0.211
(1.855)*
0.174
 (2.080)**
0.274
(1.694)*
0.307
(1.898)*
0.198
(1.862)*
0.445
(1.999)**
Ln Dev. Area per capita 0.018
(1.779)*
0.020
(2.164)**
0.018
(1.996)*
--.-- --.-- 0.021
(2.064)**
Prop. Dispersed Population 0.030
(1.900)*
--.-- 0.028
(2.616)**
--.-- --.-- --.--
Prop. Isolated Population --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.012
(1.664)*
Prop.  Population  Growth 0.012
(1.985)**
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -0.011
(-3.064)**
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Table 3: (continued)
ML Coefficient estimates(1), Expenditure category (2)
ML-Error(4) ML-Error ML-Lag ML-Lag ML-Lag ML-ErrorExplanatory variables
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
v) Benefit spillovers(5)
W x Ln Expenditure per capita 0.014
(0.586)
0.226
(2.889)**
0.316
(2.427)**
-0.353
(-4.022)**
-0.364
(-2.089)**
0.022
(0.899)
W x Prop. Commuters --.-- -0.501
 (-1.764)*
--.-- 0.523
(1.783)*
0.900
(1.893)*
-0.025
(-0.486)
W x Prop.  Overnight visitors --.-- -0.130
(-1.599)
--.-- --.-- 0.202
(1.309)
-0.015
(-0.413)
W x Prop. Commercial employ. --.-- -9.411
 (-3.004)**
--.-- 9.910
(1.435)
--.-- -5.610
(-0.413)
W x Ln Input cost -0.021
(-0.235)
-0.158
(-1.998)**
-0.265
(-1.450)
0.250
(0.896)
0.345
(1.550)
-0.017
(-1.987)**
W x Ln Dev. Area per capita -0.004
(-0.339)
-0.045
(-1.524)
-0.001
(-1.675)*
--.-- --.-- -0.028
(-1.689)*
W x Prop. Dispersed Population -0.001
(-0.458)
--.-- -0.038
(-1.754)*
--.-- --.-- --.--
W x Prop. Isolated Population --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -0.039
(-1.256)
W x Prop.  Population  Growth -0.001
(0.697)
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.047
(1.112)
W x Error 0.051
(1.874)*
0.482
(4.994)**
-0.267
(-0.880)
-0.687
(-3.354)**
0.117
(0.095)
0.063
(1.995)**
vi) Control variables
Ln Income per capita 0.650
(17.336)**
0.503
(26.737) **
0.455
(6.673)**
0.646
(14.936)**
0.682
(15.809)**
0.650
(17.012)**
Prop. Lump-Sump grants 20.339
(2.001)**
17.529
(2.461)**
17.011
(1.661)*
17.654
(1.854)*
22.441
(1.852)*
20.223
(1.675)*
Prop.  Potential revenue 11.065
(3.263)**
12.519
(2.154)**
11.465
(4.565)**
11.539
(2.741)**
10.346
(1.846)*
10.201
(3.009)**
Ln Specific grants per capita --.-- --.-- 0.322
(4.014)**
--.-- --.-- --.--
Ln Higher Resp. Expend. per capita --.-- --.-- 0.862
(3.401)**
--.-- 0.820
(2.443)**
--.--
Ln Other Layers Expend. per capita --.-- --.-- -0.455
(-1.387)
--.-- -0.033
(-1.881)*
-0.471
(-2.138)**
Index Ideology of Gov. -0.057
 (1.677)**
--.-- --.-- 0.116
(2.249)**
-0.021
(-2.425)
0.079
(2.012)**
Index Divided Gov. 0.009
(1.255)
--.-- --.-- -0.071
(-2.678)**
--.-- --.--
R2 0.579 0.628 0.669 0.659 0.647 0.649
Log L 15.175  26.530 48.191 7.313 8.624 27.798
Breusch-Pagan (Heterosked.) 5.378 7.669 8.875 12.421 2.851 4.861
Kiefer Salmon (Normality) 2.234 2.775 4.231 0.541 0.229 4.054
ML Tests of Spatial Dependence
LR Test of Spatial Lag. Depen.(W(4)) 2.792 7.458** 5.890** 10.021** 4.789** 0.785
LR Test of Spatial Error Depen. (W) 3.951* 10.086** 0.443 9.665** 0.005 3.920**
Common Factor Test
LR Test on Common Factor Hyp. (W) 10.024 12.386 39.593** 24.892** 19.332** 12.048
Notes: (1) & (2): see Table 2; (4) The matrix used in this case is WII=inverse of square distance weights., in
categories (iii) and (v), and WIV=inverse of square distance weighted by population, in categories (i), (ii), (iv) and
(vi). (5) The coefficient estimates correspond to the selected specification for each category, either the Spatial Lag
Model (ML-Lag) or the Spatial Error Model (ML-Error); (5) The coefficients in italics correspond to the alternative
specification.
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Table 4: Contribution (%) to per capita expenditure
variance explanation of different groups of variables
Expenditure Categories
  Variables
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) Total(1)
Spillover-related variables --.-- 33.679 17.946 50.524 35.927 20.802 20.897
     - Crowding by non-residents --.-- 33.679 --.-- 33.572 22.230 20.802 14.272
            - Own variables (ii) --.-- 25.351 --.-- 26.237 12.922 20.802 11.029
            - Lagged variables (iii) --.-- 8.328 --.-- 7.335 9.308 --.-- 3.243
     - Benefit spillovers (v) --.-- --.-- 17.946 16.952 13.697 --.-- 6.607
Crowding by  residents (i) 15.447 7.224 47.714 18.034 24.893 --.-- 18.529
Cost drivers (iv) 21.338 10.678 6.246 6.042 4.642 19.305 13.297
Control variables (vi) 63.214 48.419 27.134 25.398 34.537 59.275 47.192
       - Revenues (2) 60.696 48.419 21.714 16.103 23.367 42.503 40.025
       - Other (3) 2.518 --.-- 6.430 9.295 11.170 16.772 7.167
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: (1) Computed as a weighted average of the different expenditure categories, using as weights
its share in total operating expenditure: (i) General Administration=0.317, (ii) Police=0.113, (iii)
Social services=0.143, (iv) Culture and Sports=0.106, (v) Housing, Town building,  Parks and Streets
maintenance=0.164, (vi) Street cleaning, Water delivery and Sanitation=0.157.
(2) Includes income per capita, grants and potential revenues.
(3) Includes political and institutional factors.
